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Abstract—In Proof-of-Work Blockchain-based systems, the
ledger is kept consistent through some participants solving
cryptopuzzles, usually referred to as block mining. Conventional
wisdom asserts that the mining protocol is incentive-compatible.
However, whether some strategic mining behaviors occur in prac-
tice or not, has been the subject of extensive debate. In this paper,
we target this question by detecting anomalies in the statistics
of consecutive blocks among several popular cryptocurrency
systems. Firstly, we measure the inequality of mining revenue
distribution in each system. Secondly, we propose a statistical
method to identify the selfish mining (SM) behavior, a mining
attack strategy posited by Eyal and Sirer in 2014. Our method
is based on abnormal (statistically significant) high probability
of continuously mining blocks. Finally, we extend our method to
detect the mining cartels, in which miners secretly get together
and share information about newly mined blocks. Our analysis
will contribute to the research of fairness in cryptocurrency
mining by providing evidence that the aforementioned strategic
mining behaviors do take place in practice.
Index Terms—cryptocurrency, anomaly detection, selfish min-
ing, mining cartel
I. INTRODUCTION
The central part of many cryptocurrency systems is a de-
centralized and public blockchain. The consistency of system’s
ledger is maintained by all participants solving hash puzzles,
which is usually called “block mining”. In order to solve
the puzzles, attempts have to be made through brute force,
and therefore, a priori, the probability of finding a solution
is proportional to the number of tries per unit of time a
miner is able to perform. Each miner will be rewarded by
a nominal amount of cryptocurrency (designed in the supply
policy of the protocol) if said miner is the first acknowledged
one to find a valid block in the longest chain of the network.
This kind of “Proof-of-Work”(PoW) consensus is employed in
almost 90% of public blockchains [1]. This type of rewarding
system provides an incentive for miners to contribute their
resources to the system, and is essential to the crypocurrency’s
decentralized nature. According to this mechanism, the more
mining power (resources) a miner invests, the better his chance
to solve the puzzle first [2]. Thus, miners often join in mining
pools to share their mining powers, and to increase the chances
of finding blocks.
The PoW-based cryptocurrencies rely on the requirement
that the majority of miners are honest, i.e. they follow the
mining protocol. However, as shown in the Literature there
exist multiple strategies that could attack a blockchain-based
platform. For instance, the double-spending attack, the routing
attack, and the block withholding attack.
• In a double-spending attack [3], a miner attempts to use
the same assets more than once. Although this kind of
attack has never happened against the largest cryptocur-
rencies, it has happened to the smaller ones, such as
Bitcoin Gold.
• The routing attack can partition the network and delay
its block propagation. Previous studies [4] showed that
the routing attack is practically possible. According to
their analysis, during 2015 and 2016, most of the Bitcoin
nodes were hosted in a few Internet Service providers
(ISPs). Indeed, 60% of all possible Bitcoin connections
crossed 3 ISPs.
• In the block withholding attack. According to the pro-
tocol, When a miner finds a block she should submit
it to the peer nodes unconditionally. However, miners
could decide to not submit the block, or to postpone
submitting it [5]. The former one, which is named as
sabotage, has no direct benefit for the attacker but can
harm the other miners; while the latter one, which is also
known as selfish mining (SM), is more complex. Eyal
and Sirer [6] proposed and described the SM strategy as
follows: “...the selfish mining pool keeps its mined blocks
private, secretly forking the blockchain and creating a
private branch; when selfish miner reveals blocks from the
private branch to the public, the honest miners will switch
to the recently revealed block, abandoning the shorter
public branch...”. The details can be shown in Fig. 1.
The miners in the P2P mining network can be divided into
selfish miner(red node) and honest miner(green and black
nodes). At t1, a selfish miner mines a block(in red) after
the normal blockchain of t0, and he will secretly mine on
the private branch. Then, if the selfish miner continuously
finds the next block(t2A), he might publish two blocks
and gain rewards of two blocks; however, if a honest
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miner also find a block(in green) in same height(t2B), the
selfish miner will immediately publish its secret block,
and there will be a competition. In later t3, if the selfish
miners find the next block after its own block(t3A), it is
also a successful attack; if an honest miner find the next
block after the selfish miner’s block(t3B), selfish miner
enjoys the revenue of his one block; if an honest miner
find the next block after the honest miner’s block(t3C),
the selfish miner enjoys nothing and loses the revenue.
Eyal and Sirer also claimed that the honest miners would
be forced to waste their efforts on the shorter public
branch; and if the disproportionate rewards of selfish
miners encourage more honest miners to join the selfish
mining pool, it may cause the increase in the pool size
to majority and finally destroy the decentralization of
cryptocurrency ecosystem.
Fig. 1. Diagram of selfish mining strategy.
The discovery of SM attack has drawn a lot of attention
and many extended mining strategies have been proposed,
such as stubborn mining [7], and publish-n strategy [8]. These
expended strategies lower down the profitable threshold of
doing SM attack from 25% hash power [6], to 23.21% [9], or
even 21.48% [10]. Meanwhile, scholars also propose various
defenses strategies against these attacks. Existing defenses
can be categorized into two approaches: 1) making fun-
damental changes to the block validity rules, for example
ZeroBlock [11]: this is a timestamp-free solution which re-
quires that each block must be generated and received by
the network within a maximum acceptable time interval, and
2) lowering the chance of honest miners working on the
selfish miner’s chain during a forked situation, for example
weighted FRP [12]: it asks miners to compare the weight of
the chains instead of their length. However, selfish miners’
timely reaction to another competitive block, and the high
cost of changing the blockchain’s fundamental rules, both
bring difficulties to efficiently defense SM attack. In addition,
there are still some debates on whether SM strategy could be
profitable for selfish miners: some scholars argue that selfish
miners can never earn extra revenue but only put themselves at
risk for no gain [13]. These previous studies focus more on the
influence of SM attack and the way to defend from it, mostly
through building simulation or economic models on the cost-
benefit analysis. However, there is little empirical evidence
on whether miners do behave against the mining protocols in
practice [14], which can bring more fundamental to the further
researches about miners’ strategic behavior. The question of
whether selfish mining exists or not in practice is largely left
unanswered so far.
In this paper, we try to answer this question through empiri-
cal analysis on the mining fairness among some popular PoW-
based cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, Litecoin, Ethereum
and Bitcoin Cash systems. Ignoring the controversial influence
of SM strategy on the amount of miners’ revenue, we sue the
fact that selfish miners’ behavior of selectively revealing their
mined blocks would cause abnormal probability of consecu-
tively mining blocks. Based on this insight, we propose an
identification method of SM behavior by assessing miner’s
output of mining two blocks continuously. Furthermore, our
method can be extended from single miner(mining pool) to
pair of miners, and be used to identify the mining cartel. When
secretly built a cartel, miners of the cartel will benefit from
the huge mining power, as well as the information of blocks
mined by the other members.
Our main contribution is threefold: First and foremost,
up until this work, there was no definite conclusion about
whether some miners are behaving against the protocol. To
the best of our knowledge, our detection of the SM attack and
mining cartel in crypotocurrency system is presented for the
first time. In our Miner Sequence Bootstrapping model(MSB),
we provide a robust statistical method to identify the most
suspicious users conducting SM strategy. Secondly, most of the
existing studies on the threshold of mining power are focusing
on the individual mining pools, and ignoring the fact that
several mining pools could secretly work together as mining
cartels. Our paired MSB model is used to identify the secret
mining cartels. Our results show that there are some abnormal
mining pools that cannot be identified as selfish miners do
participant in mining cartels. Finally, we highlight the im-
portance of conducting empirical analyses when investigating
the fairness of blockchain-based ecosystems: mathematical or
economical models that focus on the cost-benefit analysis are
not suitable enough, as participants of cryptocurrencies might
have bounded rationality or be risk seeking.
II. METHODS
A. Revenue Inequality Indexes
Gini index. The Gini index is the most frequently used
inequality index of income or wealth distribution among a
nation’s residents [15], [16]. The Gini index can theoretically
range from 0 (complete equality) to 1 (complete inequality),










where xi is the wealth or income of an agent i, and there are
N agents.
Theil index. The Theil index is an entropy-based measure
that can be viewed as a measure of redundancy, lack of
diversity, isolation, segregation, inequality, non-randomness,
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and compressibility [17]. If the characteristic xi is the income















If all agents have the same income, then the Theil T equals
0. If one agent owns all the income, then Theil T gives the
result lnN , which is maximum level of inequality attained by


















Both Theil T and Theil L are decomposable, and the
difference between them is the part of the outcome distribution
that each index is used for. Theil L index is more sensitive to
the differences at the lower end of the distribution, while Theil
T index is more sensitive to those at the top of the distribution.
Here we apply all these three indexes to the distribution of
the monthly mining revenue among miners in each cryptocur-
rency. The xi is the number of blocks a miner i has solved
during a month, and there are N miners who have mined at
least one block during this month.
B. Identification Method of Selfish Mining
According to the “PoW” protocol, the fair proportion of
blocks a miner may discover during a time period (revenue
share) is equal to his devoted mining power (number of
attempts to solve the puzzle) divided over the total mining
power of the network. In this idealized view, the discovery of
each block is random and independent without influence from
the previous blocks, since the information diffuses through the
network instantaneously [18]. Thus, it is reasonable to assume
that during a certain time period there exists an expected
number of blocks that one miner can discover (which is
proportional to the miner’s mining power), while the order
of miners who mined blocks in this period should be random.
When doing strategic mining behavior (e.g. SM attack), how-
ever, the miners selectively publish their mined blocks. This
should lead to an identifiable increase in their success rate
of discovering two blocks consecutively (although it may not
significantly increase either the amount or the proportion of
blocks mined by selfish miners during that time period [13]).
In this study, we have proposed an identification method,
named Miner Sequence Bootstrapping model(MSB). It controls
the amount of blocks mined by each miner during a period, and
then repeatedly shuffles the sequence of miners’ discoveries of
these blocks. This model could provide the distribution and the
expected number of times that each miner could continuously
discover two blocks. In the t-th shuffle round, the number
of times that miner i continuously mines two blocks during
period T is denoted as STi (t). We have performed a bootstrap
analysis of the mining output of each miner i by comparing
the actual times CTi that miner i continuously discover two
blocks in period T with the expected times STi (t) based on
the shuffled simulation. The measurement of miner’s mining


















are the expected value and the
standard deviation of all the observations STi (t), respectively.
If MSBTi > 0, it means that for consecutively discovering
two blocks during period T , miner i succeeded more times
than he could (i.e. based on his revenue share). The larger
the MSBTi index, the more abnormal behavior of miner
i in period T . In order to identify abnormal miners with
different levels in conducting SM strategy, we need to adjust
the criterion of our identification model. In details, when we
set the criterion as MSB > 2 (with a confidence of 95%), it
means that any miner whose MSB index of a certain period
exceeds 2 will be identified as a selfish miner by our model.
C. Identification Method of Mining Cartel
We would like to point out that the existence of mining
cartels has been ignored in many previous studies. The con-
ventional wisdom believes that the mining protocol is secure as
long as the pool’s mining power is limited in certain threshold.
However, these assessments are based on the assumption that
the mining pools are operating independently. In theory, min-
ing pools could build secret cartels. The participants of these
secret cartels would benefit from the huge mining power of the
cartels, as well as the information of the mined blocks shared
by the other members. Thus, we believe that the probability
of continuous discovery of blocks among miners in the same
cartel will be abnormal. Therefore, in this part, we would
like to verify if mining pools have formed secret cartels by
extending our identification method to pairs of mining pools,
named as paired Miner Sequence Bootstrapping model(paied
MSB). When doing the identification of mining cartels, the
measurement of anomalies in the properties of consecutive











where CTij is the actual times that two consecutive blocks are
first mined by miner i, then by miner j. STij is the observed
value of each shuffle round that the number of times two









are the corresponding expected
value and the standard deviation, respectively. After determin-
ing the criterion of the paired MSB model as MC > 2, we
can label pairs of miners whose MC indexes are larger than
2 as mining cartels during certain period.
III. DESCRIPTION OF DATASETS
In this study, we have conducted statistical analysis on four
“PoW”-based crytocurrencies, which are the Bitcoin, Litecoin,
Ethereum and Bitcoin Cash.
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• Bitcoin. Bitcoin was started on 3 Januaray 2009 when
the internet persona Satoshi Nakamoto mined the genesis
block. Nowadays, this most famous digital asset has a rich
and extensive ecosystem with a total market capitalization
over 140 billions of US Dollars. About every 10 minutes,
a new block is created and quickly published to all nodes.
• Litecoin. Litecoin was a fork of the Bitcoin Core client.
The Litecoin network went live on 13 October 2011 dif-
fering primarily by having a decreased block generation
time (2.5 minutes), increased maximum number of coins,
different hashing algorithm, and a slightly modified GUI.
• Ethereum. Ethereum was proposed in late 2013, and
went live on 30 July 2015 featuring smart contract
functionality. The block time of Ethereum is 14 to 15
seconds.
• Bitcoin Cash. Bitcoin Cash was a hard fork of Bitcoin
that seeks to add more transaction capacity to the net-
work. The first Bitcoin Cash software implementation
was released on 1 August 2017. In both Bitcoin and
Bitcoin Cash, one new block will be generated every ten
minutes on average. Bitcoin Cash had an instability in
mining difficulty around Octobor 2017, resulting in being
thousands of blocks ahead of Bitcoin.
Our datasets of four crytocurrencies contain information of
blocks from their launch to the end of 2019, including block
height, mined time, the corresponding miners, etc.
IV. RESULTS
A. Evolution of miners and blocks
From the genesis block to the one at the end of 2019,
the number of blocks and mining pools during each month
in each cryptocurrency system are shown in Fig. 2. One can
find that the mining markets of all the four cryptocurrencies
have unstable stages with different lengths after launch. To
minimize the error in our following identification of strategic
mining behaviors, our simulation experiment only focuses on
the relative stable periods for both miners and blocks. That is
split by the dash line in Fig. 2), which marks out the begin-
ning of our simulation time-window in each cryptocurrency:
January 2012 in Bitcoin, May 2015 in Litecoin, September
2015 in Ethereum, and December 2017 in Bitcoin Cash.
Fig. 2. Monthly number of miners and blocks in Bitcoin, Litecoin, Ethereum,
Bitcoin Cash
B. Revenue share among large pools
Fig. 3. Monthly revenue share among miners in Bitcoin, Litecoin, Ethereum,
Bitcoin cash
We have shown the monthly revenue distributions of some
large mining pools in Fig. 3. The “Unknown” miner are some
mining addresses whose identities cannot be traced back to
any known entity. It is worth to mention that some of the
unknown mining addresses might be owned by named pools
(e.g. to hide their activities such as selfish mining). In our
Ethereum dataset, each block was mined by a known hash
address, while “Unknown” mining addresses exist in all the
other three cryptocurrencies. In detail, one can observe that
in Bitcoin and Litecoin more and more rewards were gained
by named pools, and in Bitcoin Cash there are more than
20% of blocks are mined by “Unknown” miners all the time.
According to the “PoW” mechanism, the revenue share can
reflect these pools’ mining power in some extent. Therefore,
these four cryptocurrency systems seem to be secure when
only assess on the statistic result of revenue share: There
are few miners sometimes hold more than 25% of the total
power, and no one holds a mining power in excess of the
majority(50%).
C. Inequality of mining revenue distribution
To further study the fairness of mining in each cryptocur-
rency system, we measured the inequality among values of
mining revenue distribution using Gini index, Theil-T index,
and Theil-l index. The inequality of miners’ monthly revenue
are shown in Fig. 4, in which the result of Ethereum is based
on all its miners, while results of the other three cryptocur-
rencies are based on their named mining pools. According to
these three inequality indexes, the mining revenue among all
miners in Ethereum is very unequal: most of the blocks are
mined by a very small group of miners, and its Gini indexes of
each month are always above 0.9. In addition, when focusing
more on the revenue among small pools(from Theil-l index)
than that among large pools(from Theil-T index), all the four
cryptocurrencies present a higher inequality in terms of mining
revenue. The larger Theil-l indexes also indicate that there are
seemingly many pools with very low mining power in each
system when not considering the potentially secret associations
among them.
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Fig. 4. Three inequality indexes of monthly mining revenue in Bitcoin,
Litecoin, Ethereum, Bitcoin Cash
D. The MSB indexes of miners
In the main part of this study, we have proposed a MSB
model to identify the most suspicious selfish miners in cryp-
tocurrency systems. We have focused on the period when
the number of blocks and miners were relatively stable, and
then conducted 1000 times shuffle simulations on the block
mining outputs of each month. The pools’ monthly MSB
indexes calculated by our MSB model corresponding to their
revenue share are shown in Fig. 5. As we have mentioned
before, according to the “PoW” protocol, one miner’s revenue
share during a period can reflects his mining power of this
period. Therefore, the results in Fig. 5 show that in Bitcoin,
Litecoin and Ethereum, some miners with less mining powers
might conduct more SM strategy, while in Bitcoin Cash
mining, pools with various mining powers could involve in
SM strategy.
Fig. 5. Monthly MSB index of miners corresponding with their monthly
revenue share in Bitcoin, Litecoin, Ethereum, Bitcoin Cash
E. Identified selfish miner
Under the criterion MSB > 2, which means that any miner
i whose MSBTi index of month T exceeds 2 will be identified
as a selfish miner by our MSB model. These detected selfish
miners in every cryptocurrency are shown in Fig. 6, where
the miners are ranked by the number of times they have been
identified (we have only displayed the top 8 miners in each
cryptocurrency). The identification results show that the SM
strategy might have been implemented by several miners in
each system, and the identified selfish miners in Ethereum and
Bitcoin Cash might be more likely to continuously behave in
SM strategy.
Fig. 6. The identified selfish miners of each month in Bitcoin, Litecoin,
Ethereum, Bitcoin Cash
F. Identified mining cartel
To detect the existence of mining cartel, we used the paired
MSB model to calculate the monthly MC value of each pair
of miner pools (in Ethereum, because of the enormous amount
of miners, we could only include pools with more than 1%
revenue share). After determining the criterion of the paired
MSB model as MC > 2, we have labeled pairs of miners
i − j whose MCTij values of month T are larger than 2 as
mining cartels. The number of times that each pair of miners
is labeled as a mining cartel are shown in Fig. 7. The miners
are ranked by the sum of times they have been identified as
a member in a cartel. We show the mining cartels among the
top 20 miners in Bitcoin and Ethereum, and among all the
miners in Litecoin and Bitcoin Cash. We have noticed that
some abnormal mining pools that can not be identified by our
first model do participant in cartels. Besides, mining cartel
is more common among different miners in Bitcoin system,
but less common in Ethereum. In Litecoin and Bitcoin Cash,
mining cartel is always built by certain group of miners.
V. DISCUSSION
Given the fact that for blockchain-based systems, prior trust
between users is not a requirement [19], [20], enabling fairness
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Fig. 7. Frequency of building cartel among different mining pools in Bitcoin,
Litecoin, Ethereum, Bitcoin Cash
at all the levels in cryptocurrencies system is mandatory. In this
paper, we have developed a new methodology and conducted
statistical analysis on mining fairness in four “PoW”-based
crytocurrencies.
In the first study, we have shown the evolution on number
of miners and blocks, and we also find that the revenue
distribution among all miners in Ethereum is unequal. By
proposing a Miner Sequence Bootstrapping(MSB) model, we
are able to identify abnormal miners, in the sens the likelihood
to mine consecutive blocks in a system is much larger than that
of a fair distribution (given the realised share of nodes they
mine). We believe that the reason why some mining pools
could have abnormal continuously success rates is because
they are employing the selfish mining strategy.
Regardless of whether this will lead to the monetary gain or
not, we emphasize that the selfish mining strategy could lead
to the abnormal high probability of consecutively discovering
two blocks. In addition to that, our result also shows that both
mining pools with high computing power and those with lower
computing power could conduct selfish mining strategy. This
finding is against the previous finding that only mining pools
with at least 25% computing power would have the incentive
to perform selfish mining strategy [6]. This is might because
although the analytical model shows that selfish miners with
less than 25% computing power is non-profitable, in reality,
people have bounded rationality (or sometimes they are even
risk seeking) and cannot estimate the expected return of selfish
mining strategy. Besides, those mining addresses with low
revenue share but high MSB value could be used by selfish
miners to hide their strategic behavior.
Given the fact that secret mining cartels may cause certain
threats to the security of blockchain-based systems, we have
extended our model to pair of pools in order to detect mining
cartels. We have found that the mining cartels exist in each
system. We note that the existence of mining cartels has been
ignored in many previous studies.
There are still some limitations in our work: We have pro-
posed that the selfish mining attack and forming mining cartels
are two possible reasons of the abnormal high continuously
success rate. There might be other explanations (like finite
diffusion times). Our next step is to extend our methods on
identifying other strategic mining behaviors [21], for instance
cheating by one-time use addresses.
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